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OLAF THEODORE STEVENSON, JR.,
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSON,
Plaintitts/AppeLldiiLs,
v.
NICK N . NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES,
a partnership, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS,
GEORGE BRUCE BREINHOLT and
WELDEN L. DAINES,

CASE NO. 14006

Defendants/Respondents.
* * * * * * * * * * * *

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS
DAB ASSOCIATES, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS,
GEORGE BRUCE BREINHOLT AND WELDON L. DAINES
x

x

7v 7v *

*

*

*

i

j'c ' k

*

NATURE OF THE CASE
Thi& i* ;
for allege*

m l a w f u l detainer action brought by Appellants

' . t -\ • r

U M I .iqreenieni

"\ I L

Respondents counterclaimed for breach oi the covenant oJ
qi i:i e t :ii: I peaceful possession, malicious prosecution,
attorney "' s fees and puniti ve damages.

Respondents P iM

Associates, Anagnostakis (herein referred to as "Aggie")
",l* ' "' ill, iinl Ih'iivi^fj (..ill hereinafter collectively referred
•-.•• ifDAB") also counterclaimed . ;
Appellants•
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial was held before the Honorable Peter F. Leary,
District Judge of the Third Judicial District, sitting
without a jury.

Following conclusion of the trial, the

court entered a decision, Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and Judgment awarding attorney's fees to all Respondents, awarding Respondent DAB $613.01 for debts owed to
them by the Appellants, and dismissing all other claims of
Appellants and Respondents.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent DAB prays that the Judgment be reversed as
follows:

(1) as to the Trial Court's denial of Respondent's

Motion to Dismiss based upon waiver, collateral estoppel and
res judicata; (2) as to the Trial Court's denial of Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for defective notice; (3) as to the
Trial Court's dismissal of Respondent's counterclaim against
Appellants for violation of the covenant of quiet and peaceful
possession.

In all other respects, Respondent DAB prays

that the Judgment be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At the outset, it should be noted that the Appellants,
in their statement of facts, have relied largely on those
aspects of the record which are most favorable to themselves,
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to the exclusion of other facts which are far more supportive
of the District Court's decision.

Under familiar rules of

appeal, this Court must do just the opposite, i.e. it must
view the evidence most favorably to the Trial Court's Judgment.
Hoggin & Hall & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414
P.2d 89 (1966).

Therefore, in order that this court be

fully cognizant of the evidence which prompted and supports
the Trial Court's decision, the Respondents believe that a
restatement of the facts contained in the record is essential
and necessary to this review.
In order to avoid duplication, Respondent DAB incorporates by reference the Statement of Facts contained in Respondent
Nikol's Brief.

However, the following facts, relevant only

to those issues peculiar to this Brief, must be provided to
supplement the statement of facts offered by Respondent
Nikols:

j

Appellants are lessees of certain real property on
which they operate the Salt Lake Athletic Club (formerly the
Towne House Athletic Club) (R.83).

For ten years prior to

December 1, 1971, Appellants operated a dining room for the
benefit of club members

(R.92)

and the Appellants leased

the dining room facilities to Respondent Nikols on or about
December 1, 1971

(R.242).

The portions of the lease to

Nikols which are relevant to this Brief are as follows:
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* * *

16.

Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if either
defaults in any of the conditions and terms of this
lease, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and
expenses, including attorney fees, which may arise or
accrue from enforcing this lease or in obtaining
possession of the premises or in pursuing any remedy
provided by the laws of the State of Utah whether by
filing suit or otherwise. (emphasis added)
(Exhibit 13-P; R.251)
* * *

19. Heirs and
the benefit of
and assigns of
(Exhibit 13-P;

Assigns. This Sublease shall inure to
and be binding upon the heirs, successor
the parties hereto. (emphasis added)
R.252)

On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols transferred the
restaurant to Respondent DAB

(R.254).

Appellants consented

to this action, by signing a document entitled "Consent to
Sublease", the relevant portion of which is as follows:
The undersigned, OLAF T. STEVENSEN and
BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, the Lessor in that certain
lease, for the premises designated 158 South 3rd
East, Salt Lake City, Utah, hereby consents
pursuant to Paragraph 18 thereof to the assignment
of NICK N. NIKOLS, of said lease to WELDEN L.
DAINES, GEORGE ANAGNOSTAKIS, & G. B. BREINHOLT.
(emphasis added) (Exhibit 9-P)
At the time that DAB accepted the assignment, members
of the Towne House Athletic Club (now the Salt Lake Athletic
Club) were allowed to charge their meals

(R.198-199).

Mr.

Nikols testified that this credit was extended "only as a
courtesy to Mr. Stevensen" and at Stevenson's specific
request and insistence (R.182).

When some of the members of

the Towne House Athletic Club failed to pay their bills,
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Aggie approached Stevensen's secretary, who informed him
that the charges were "trade-outs" which Mr. Stevensen had
allowed specific members to sign and Aggie so understood
them to be (R.199).

The person responsible for a large

share of the charges, Mr. Reed Watkins (a lawyer in the firm
representing Appellant) stated to Aggie that he continued
charging only because Stevensen owed him money (R.199).
Stevensen has acknowledged his indebtedness to Aggie for the
stated amount and has promised to work something out on the
rent

(R.199-200).
On or about July 15f 1974, Stevensen advised Aggie that

thereafter he would not back any charges made by members of
his club and upon being so advised Aggie thereafter refused
to extend any further credit to Towne House Club members
(R.211).

The sum of $613.01 awarded by the Trial Court to

the Respondent included only those charges made prior to
July 15, 1974, the date of Stevensen's refusal to back up
charges made by members of his club

(Exhibit 22-D).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION TO HEAR
PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF
APPEAL WAS NOT TIMELY FILED, AND THE APPEAL
SHOULD BE DISMISSED.
The arguments of this point respecting Points I and II
of plaintiff's appeal are identical to those presented in
Point I of the Reply Brief of Respondent Nick N. Nikols. The
points raised therein by Respondent Nikols apply equally to
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these Respondents and, Respondent Nikols having accurately
stated the law with respect thereto, these Respondents adopt
Point I of Respondent Nikols brief herein to the same full
extent and effect as if reiterated in full herein.

In

addition to the discussion by Respondent Nikols, Respondent
DAB offers the following with respect to Point III of
Plaintiff's appeal:
It is clear from the authorities cited and arguments
presented in Point I of the Reply Brief of Respondent
Nick N. Nikols, that the shorter periods for filing a notice
of appeal should apply to Point III, as well as Points I and
II, of plaintiff's appeal.

It is obvious that only one appeal

time should be applicable to a single appeal, although it
involves severable and distinct claims.

Thus, the question

which presents itself to this court, is which of the two
periods for filing a notice of appeal should be applicable
to this action.
In 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 431 at page 82,
the following rule is stated:
As between two such special periods, either of which,
if it stood alone, would be capable of applying to
a particular situation, that which points the more
directly and specifically to the case at hand is the
one with which the party appealing must conform;
. . . (citing cases.)
i

Thus, where the action was brought and can best be defined as

|

one in unlawful detainer, the specific appeal time provided
in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-36-11 (1953) must be applied.
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'

A similar, but even more compelling, reason for applying
the shorter time for filing a notice of appeal, is provided
by the fact that this Court must defer to the legislative
intent expressed in the unlawful detainer statute.
v, Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).

See Stanton
It is

clear from the various provisions of the statute, including
the shortened time for appearance provided in Section 78-36-8
and the shortened time for filing a notice of appeal provided
in Section 78-36-11, that the legislature intended to provide
in the unlawful detainer statute a summary method for resolving
conflicts arising thereunder.

It is equally clear that the

application of the longer appeal period to this case would
do violence to that expressed legislative intent.

Thus, if

this Court determines that only one appeal time should apply
to this appeal, the shorter period should apply and the
appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Even if we

assume arguendo that two distinct periods for filing a
notice of appeal should apply, it is clear that the issues
raised in Points I and II of the Appellant's brief should be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and this court's review
be restricted to the issues presented in Point III. Any
other conclusion would violate the legislature's clearly
expressed intent.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS BASED UPON THE DOCTRINES OF
RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

-7-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
THE PLAINTIFFS1 NOTICE TO CURE DEFAULT OR QUIT AND
NOTICE TO QUIT ARE DEFECTIVE AND INADEQUATE TO
SUPPORT AN ACTION IN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
Points II and III are identical to Points II and III of
the Reply Brief of Respondent Nick N. Nikols.

The points

raised therein by Respondent Nikols apply equally to these
Respondents and, Respondent Nikols having accurately stated
the law with respect thereto, these Respondents adopt
Points II and III of Respondent Nikols1 brief herein to the
same full extent and effect as if reiterated in full herein,
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
DEFENDANT DAB WAS PROPER
A. The Lease Agreement Provides for Award of
Attorney's Fees.
B. When the Trial Court Specifically Dismissed
Plaintiffs' Complaint Against Defendants, No Cause of
Action, the Court Should Have Found as a Matter of Law
that the Plaintiffs Had Breached the Covenant of Quiet
and Peaceful Possession.
Subparagraphs A and B of this point are identical to
Subparagraphs A and B of Point IV of the Reply Brief of
Respondent Nick N. Nikols, The points raised therein by
Respondent Nikols apply equally to these Respondents and,
Respondent Nikols having accurately stated the law with
respect thereto, these Respondents adopt Subparagraphs A and
B of Point IV of Respondent Nikols' brief herein to the same
full extent and effect as if reiterated in full herein.
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In

addition to the discussion by Respondent Nikols, Respondent
DAB offers the following with respect to Subparagraph B
hereof:
The Respondents, by raising a counterclaim against the
Appellants for a breach of covenant of quiet and peaceful
possession, were enforcing the lease and pursuing a remedy
provided by the laws of the State of Utah.

Thus the court's

award of attorney's fees pursuant to the provisions of
Paragraph 16 of the lease was proper and appropriate.

The

Appellants have attempted to undermine this conclusion by
suggesting that Paragraph 16 of the lease provides that in
the event of default only the defaulting party would pay
attorney's fees, and arguing that since the Trial Court
determined that the Respondents in their counterclaim, had
failed to prove their cause of action, it affirmatively
established that the Appellants were not in default.

Such a

conclusion is wholly unmerited for the reasons hereinafter
discussed.
At the outset, it should be noted that under standard
and familiar rules of appeal, the findings and conclusions
of the Trial Court are presumed to be valid and the burden
is on the Appellant to establish otherwise.

Latimer v. Katz,

29 Utah 2d 280, 508 P.2d 542 (1973); Hardy v. Hendrickson,
27 Utah 2d 251, 495 P.2d 28 (1972); Jensen v. Eddy, 30 Utah
2d 154, 514 P.2d 1142 (1973).

The Supreme Court must not

disturb the ruling on appeal unless it " . . . manifestly
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appears that the court misapplied the law to the established
facts."

Hardy v. Hendriclcson, supra, at 29. The following

review of the law and facts manifestly shows that the Trial
Court accurately applied the applicable law.

fi

o

In view of the provisions of Paragraph 16 of the ;
lease, the court's award of attorney's fees constitutes a
tacit acknowledgement that the Plaintiff/Appellant was in
default of the lease.

The Appellant argues, howeverf that

such a conclusion is unwarranted because of the court's
determination that the Respondents failed to establish a
cause of action under their counterclaim.

Such an argument

erroneously assumes that a court's ruling of "no cause of
action" in a contract action necessarily establishes that
the Defendant (Plaintiff here) did not breach the provisions
of the lease or contract.
In fact, under general principles of contract law, such
a ruling could be based on several alternative grounds. For
example, as provided in 17A C.J.S. Contracts §§ 533, 566, it
is necessary in order to state a cause of action ex contractu
that the Plaintiff allege and prove (1) the existence of a
valid contract, (2) the obligation of the Defendant thereunder,
(3) the violation of the contract's provisions by the Defendant,
and (4) damages resulting therefrom.

Thus, in the absence

of allegations and proof of damage, a breach of contract
action is not sufficient to support a judgment.
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This position

has been sustained in several cases, including

M. G. Chamberlain

& Co. v. Simpson, 173 C.A.2d 263, 343 P.2d 438 (1959) and
Hodges v. Gronvold, 54 Wash. 2d 478, 341 P.2d 857 (1959).
In Hodges, the Supreme Court of Washington held that regardless
of whether a breach of the contractual provisions was
proven, a failure to prove and establish damages resulting
therefrom is a sufficient basis for the Trial Court's dismissal
of the action by a judgment of nonsuit. As the Court
stated at 341 P.2d 858:
Since a showing of damages was necessary to
sustain appellants' cause of action, the trial court,
having concluded that no proof of damages had been made
by appellants, did not pass upon the question of
whether or not respondents had breached the contract.
It is therefore clear that a judgment of "no cause of action"
may well be based solely on a finding that the Plaintiffs
(Defendants here) failed to establish the requisite element
of damages resulting from the breach.

Similarly, the California

District Court of Appeals in Chamberlain stated:
. . . . . The elements of a cause of action for
breach of contract are the making of the contract and
its terms, plaintiff's performance, defendants' breach,
and damage to plaintiff therefrom. (emphasis added)
(343 P.2d 445)
The Supreme Court of Utah also held that proof of damages is
an essential element of a cause of action ex contractu in
State Automobile & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 27 Utah
2d 229, 494 P.2d 529 (1972), when it stated:

"[IJJ[ failure

to so perform those duties results in damage to the other
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party he is entitled to recover for breach of contractual
duties."

(emphasis added)

(494 P.2d 531, 532) : t

Thus the court's determination that the Respondents
failed to prove their cause of action for breach of the
covenant of quiet and peaceful possession on their counterclaim
did not establish that the Appellants were not in default
under the lease as Appellants claim.

The court's determina-

tion must have been based on its finding that the Respondent
failed to establish the existence of damages and thus failed
to prove the cause of action.

Such a conclusion not only

supports the presumption of validity of the Court's findings
r

and conclusions but also shows a proper application of the
law to the facts.
The concept is bolstered by the fact that the terms of
the lease do not grant attorney's fees to the prevailing
party, but rather, provide that, in the event of default,
the defaulting party should pay attorney's fees.

Thus, the

Court must have concluded that the Appellants were in default
and were therefore liable for attorney's fees, but denied
the Respondent's claims on an alternative basis, such as a
failure to establish the existence of damages resulting from
the Appellant's default.
C. Respondent DAB is Entitled to an Award of
Attorney Fees by Virtue of the Lease Agreement.
The facts of this case and the applicable law show that
the agreement between Respondent Nikols and Respondent DAB
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constituted an assignment of all of the terms and conditions
of the principal lease and, therefore, the provision of said
lease providing for the payment of attorney's fees by a
defaulting party inures to the benefit of Respondent DAB as
an assignee of the principal lease. Appellants argue that
an attorney's fee provision of the lease between the Appellants
and Respondent Nikols does not inure to the benefit of
Respondent DAB.

Such an argument lacks merit for although

the subsequent lease between Respondents DAB and Nikols
purports to be a sublease between said parties, it in fact
constitutes an assignment of the principle lease between the
Appellants and Respondent Nikols. As such it is clear that
Respondent DAB thereby became a beneficiary of the provisions
of the principle lease, both under a plain interpretation of
the lease and under the general principles of the case law.
In comparing the two leases involved (i.e. both the
principle lease between Stevensen and Nikols, and the subsequent
lease between Nikols and DAB), it is clear that Nikols
conveyed his entire estate, retaining no reversionary interest
in the lease.

The leases terminate on the same day, the

30th day of November, 1976, and provide for precisely the
same options to renew.

Further evaluation of the two leases

shows that Nikols conveyed to DAB all of the rights and
responsibilities which he received and undertook pursuant to
his lease with Stevensen - the terms of the two leases are
identical and any variations are entirely superficial.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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It is clearly established in the case law that the
conveyance of an entire estate is ,an assignment of the
principle lease and not the creation of a sublease.

This

principle holds true regardless of provisions within the
lease which would suggest otherwise.

In Jensen v. O.K.

Investment Corporation, 29 Utah 2d 231, 235-6, 507 P.2d 713,
716 (1973), this Court, citing 3A Thompson on Real Property
(1954 Replacement), Sec. 1210, pp. 53-55, stated that:
. . . Technical terms or special words are not
necessary to an assignment. Any language which shows
the intention of the parties to transfer the property
from one to the other is sufficient, the form of the
instrument being immaterial. If it has the legal
effect to pass to another the lessee's interest in the
whole or in any part of the demised premises for his
entire term, or the remainder of his term, it is an
assignment . . .

o

The formal character of the paper or the designation given the transaction in the contract is not
important in determining whether an instrument is a
sublease or an assignment. When the lessee's entire
estate passes the instrument is an assignment, though
words of demise are used, and rent and a right of
reentry for nonpayment are reserved, or even though
it is called a sublease . . . .
The test is whether
the grant leaves a reversionary interest in the
original lessee or operates to transfer his entire
term . . . .
A sublease for the whole term is in law an assignment as between the original lessor and the sublessee,
Where the instrument creates an assignment and not
a sublease the relationship of landlord and tenant
exists between the lessor and the assignee and
their rights inter se are determined accordingly,
(emphasis added)
t

Accord;

49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 392,51C

C.J\S. Landlord and Tenant § 37(1), May v. Walters, 67 N.M. 297,
354 P.2d 1114 (1960), Gordon Inv. Co. v. Jones 123 Colo 253,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

.n
227 P.2d 336 (1951), Groth v. Continental Oil Co, 84 Ida.
409, 373 P.2d 548 (1962), Bedgisoff v. Morgan, 23 Wash. 2d 737,
162 P.2d 238 (1945). By this statement of the law it is
manifestly clear that the conveyance of his entire term by
Respondent Nikols constituted an assignment of the principle
lease.

Further and conclusive support for this position is

derived from the instrument whereby the Appellant agreed to
the transfer.

In the Consent to Sublease (Exhibit 9-P),

the Appellant agreed "to the assignment of Nick N. Nikols,
of said lease to Weldon L. Daines, George Anagnostakis, and
G. B. Breinhardt."

(emphasis added)

It is, therefore,

conclusively established that the instrument reflecting the
agreement between Respondent Nikols and Respondent DAB
constituted an assignment of the principle lease.
Since the agreement between Respondents Nikols and DAB
constitutes an assignment of the Stevensen-Nikols lease, it
is clear that the attorney's fees provision inures to the
benefit of Respondent DAB, as the assignee of said lease.
The principle lease clearly establishes that it was the
intention of both Appellant Stevensen and Respondent Nikols
that all of the lease provisions should both burden and
benefit all assignees of the lease.

Paragraph 19 of the

principle lease resolutely provides that "this sublease
shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the heirs,
successors, and assigns of the parties hereto." (Exhibit 13-P,
R.252).

Thus, by specific agreement between Appellant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Stevensen and Respondent Nikols, the provisions of the
principle lease were intended to inure to the benefit of all
assignees of the lessee.

The intent of the parties at the

time they entered into the principle lease must prevail. The
parties having agreed that their successors and assigns
would hold and be subject to all of the benefits of the
lease, it must be held that DAB, an assignee, is entitled to
the benefits of the attorney's fee provisions of the lease.
Assuming arguendo that the provisions of Paragraph 19
are not explicit and conclusive it is nevertheless clear,
under general principles of property law, that the attorney's
fees provision of the principle lease inures to the benefit
of Respondent DAB as an assignee of said lease.

The traditional

view is well-stated in 1 American Law of Property § 3.61
(1952), at 311:
"The lessee's assignee acquires the estate of the
lessee and comes into privity of estate with the
lessor by force of the assignment, without entry. He
therefore has the benefit and burden of all covenants
running with the land so long as he holds the estate.
Accord 2 Powell, Real Property 1(246(1), (2) (1974).
And as stated in 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant § 397:
"According to the prevailing view, a lessee, during
his occupancy of the demised premises, holds both by
privity of estate and of contract. When he assigns his
lease, he divests himself of the privity of estate,
although not of the privity of contract. By such assignment a privity of estate is at once created between the
assignee and the original lessor . . . "
(citing
cases)
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It is further stated at 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord and Tenant
S 449, that:
"The assignee of a leasehold estate succeeds to all
the interest of the lessee and to the benefit of all
the covenants and agreements of the lessor which are
next to and run with the estate. As a general rule,
covenants by the lessor in a lease relating to the
thing demised run with the land so that an action at
law can be maintained in the name of the assignee, even
though the covenant does not in certain instances, have
reference to something to be done upon the land itself."
(Citing cases)
Thus, the agreement between Respondent Nikols and
Respondent DAB being an assignment of the principle lease,
the provision within the principle lease granting a right to
recover attorney fees and expenses incurred in curing any
default under the principle lease inures to the benefit of
Respondent DAB.

Although the attorney's fee provision does

not refer specifically to the premises itself, the rule is
equally applicable. As stated by the Oregon Supreme Court
in Hudspeth v. Eastern Oregon Land Co., 247 Ore. 372, 430
P.2d 353, 356 (1967):
"There is nothing in the nature of things which requires the conclusion that the benefit of a covenant is
not capable of running with the land unless the performance of the promise will constitute an advantage of a
physical sense to the promises in leases have been held
to run to successors of the lessor in cases where the
promise was not related to the physical use of the
land."
It is further stated in 2 Powell, Real Property, 1(246 (2)
(1974), that:
"In general, modern cases seek to determine whether the
covenant was intended by the original parties to be
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performed only by the covenantor personally, or to
inure only to the benefit of the covenantee personally,
or, as is usually the case, was intended by them to
regulate the relations of the persons who from time to
time might be lessor and lessee of the affected premises.
Except when the covenant is found to have the atypical
personal character, both burden and benefit run to the
successors of the original lessor and lessee."
(emphasis added)
It is self-evident that a lease provision which grants
attorney's fees expended in curing a default under the lease
is not personal to the principle parties, but rather regulates
the relations of whoever occupies the position of lessor and
lessee of the premises, since the only person having any
interest in curing the default is the person standing in the
position of a lessee or lessor; the original covenantors
having lost both the ability and interest to cure such a
default by their assignment of the lease.

Thus, it is clear

that the attorney's fees provision in the principle lease
runs with the land and therefore inures to the benefit of
Respondent DAB.
In 1940, this court held, in a case factually distinctive
from the instant case, that a lease provision which provided
that either party would pay cost and attorney's fees incurred
by the other in enforcing the covenants of the lease did not
run with the land and was a personal covenant between the
parties to the contract.

In Latses vs. Nick Floor, Inc., 99

Utah 214, 104 P.2d 619 (1940), it was held that, since the
Appellant was an assignee of the lessor and did not expressly
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agree to abide by all the terms of the lease, such a provision
within the lease could not be held valid as against such
Appellant/Assignee. The case is distinguishable from the
instant case. The Appellant in Latses was the assignee of
the lessor whereas here DAB is the assignee of the lessee.
And the Latses Court laid heavy emphasis on the fact that
the assignee did not expressly agree to abide by all the
terms of the lease whereas here the assignee (DAB) expressly
bound itself to all the terms and obligations of the lease
(Exhibit 6-P, R.260).

While there may be reasons for not

enforcing a provision within the principle lease against an
assignee which did not expressly agree to the provision, the
same policies do not apply where it is the assignee who is
attempting to enforce the provisions of a lease and where the
assignee has expressly agreed to abide by all of the lease
provisions.
It should also be noted that the Court's decision in
Latses conflicts with the modern trend of authorities as
summarized by Powell on Real Property, supra, and with the
general weight of authority handed down in recent decisions
by the courts of the surrounding states.

For example: The

Supreme Court of Oregon in Jack Mathis General Contractors,
Inc. v. Murphy, 472 P.2d 820 (1970), held that a promise in
a lease to pay an attorney's fee was a covenant that ran
with the reversion (i.e. the land) and was enforceable
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against the lessor by an assignee.

And the California District

Court of Appeal, in Rosenkranz v. Pellin, 99 C.A. 2d 650, 222
P.2d 249, 251 (1950) also held that:
"A lessee is under a duty to his lessor to perform the
covenants of the lease. An assignee who assumes the
lease binds himself to perform these covenants. . . .
[The assignee] was bound to respondent by the covenants
of the lease by which the lessee agreed to pay the
lessor a reasonable attorney's fee in the event an
action was filed to compel the performance of the terms
and conditions of the lease or to terminate it."
In view of the fact that the position taken by the Utah
Supreme Court is not directly applicable to the case involved
here, and the additional fact that such a position has not
been adopted by other states, the Court's holding in Latses
is not binding on nor dispositive of this case.

POINT V
ANY CHANGE IN THE OPERATION OF THE LEASED
PREMISES WAS NOT A BREACH OF THE LEASE
POINT VI
THE ALLEGED BREACHES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT
SUFFICIENT TO RESULT IN A FORFEITURE OF THE
DEFENDANTS' LEASE AGREEMENT
Points V and VI are identical to Points V and VI of the
Reply Brief of Respondent Nick N. Nikols.

The points raised

therein by Respondent Nikols apply equally to these Respondents
and, Respondent Nikols having accurately stated the law with
respect thereto, these Respondents adopt Points V and VI of
Respondent Nikols brief herein to the same full extent and
effect as if reiterated in full herein.
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POINT VII
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED $613.01 TO RESPONDENT
DAB FOR DEBTS OWED TO THEM BY THE APPELLANTS.
At the outset, it should be noted that the Trial Court1s
failure to establish a legal basis for its award of $613.01
to Respondent DAB, if in fact it did not, is not a basis for
reversing its decision.

This Court has repeatedly held that

even where the Trial Court based its decision on an unsubstantiated point of law, the decision will not be reversed
if there existed a legitimate and solid basis for the ruling,
e.g. Foss Lewis & Sons v. General Ins. Co. of America, 30
Utah 2d 290, 517 P.2d 539 (1973), Green Ditch Water Co. v.
Salt Lake City, 15 Utah 2d 224, 390 P.2d 586 (1964).

Reason

dictates that the same general rule applies where the Trial
Court fails to state the legal basis for its decision.
Thus, if the Trial Court's decision and analysis of the
evidence can be sustained under any legal theory, it may not
be overturned.
A review of the trial transcript clearly reveals that
there is a substantial basis for the court's determination
that Appellant Stevensen is indebted to Respondent DAB in
the sum of $613.01. The testimony of Respondent Nikols and
Respondent Aggie is uncontroverted.

And that testimony

establishes the basis upon which the Court made its determination.

Nikols testified that the practice of allowing

members of the Town House Athletic Club to charge their
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meals began during his tenure as operator of the restaurant
and was undertaken at the specific request and insistence of
Stevensen (R. 182). Upon assuming the lease from Nikols,
Respondent Aggie continued the practice (R.198-199).

When

the charges remained unpaid, Aggie approached Stevensen's
secretary about the matter and was informed that the charges
were "trade-outs" which Mr. Stevensen had undertaken with
members of his club (R. 199). In reliance on this representation,
Aggie continued the practice (R. 199, 201). Aggie's belief
in Stevensen's obligation for the charges was bolstered when
he was informed by Mr. Reed Watkins, Stevensen1s lawyer and
the person responsible for a large share of the charges,
that he, Watkins, continued to charge at the restaurant only
because Stevensen owed him money (R. 199). Finally, in a
conversation with Aggie, Stevensen acknowledged his indebtedness to Aggie and promised to work something out on the
rent (R. 200).
This uncontroverted evidence is clearly sufficient to
establish that Stevensen is liable to Aggie for the $613.01,
both as a result of the agreement which Stevensen had
reached with the members of his club to whom he owed money,
and as a result of an actual or implied contract between
Aggie and Stevensen.

The testimony is further bolstered by

an analysis of the charge slips and billing sheet entered
into evidence as Exhibit 22-D.

Those documents reveal that
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the lion's share of the charges are made by either Stevensen,

(Stevensew';

v Com*-

<;s .-iud^d fror :;ucn :v^dence

that the charges made at Aggie f s restaurant were part of a
scheme whereby Stevensen was paying bis ^:.*-. •
and encouraging such members to use * is clul

: members
-* adjacent

Appellants can not argue that the evidence is disputed.
Stevensen did not refute the testimony of "• «

Respondent ,

and/ where a party possesses • -. - •• . oaj<.

ma1 .t<

not produce evidence, with respect thereto, it :i s presumed
that tt le evi dence wou ] d be adv< T N O fn hi r- r I ai in , Blackburn
v. Colvin, 191 Kan, 239, 380 P. 2d 4 1/ (I'ibll; Budget Plan
Haner, 12 I< la

56 f 436 P. 2d 111 ( 1 968).

^ateci by I :! le Siipi: eme Coi :i :i : I: :) I: I J I .ah

^.raerican

Scale Mfg. C o , v, Zee, 120 Utah 402 r 40 7, 23^ r . 2d 363
(1951):
Where the testimony of a witness is uncontradicted and not inherently improbable, and there are
no circumstances tending to raise a doubt of its truth,
the facts so proven should be taken as conclusively
established and verdict directed or decision entered
accordingly.
(citing National Bank of Commerce in
N.Y. v, Bottolfson, 55 S.D. ] 96 r 225 N W. 385, 386,
69 A.L.R. 892 (1929))
• The evidence of the debt being uncontroverted, not
inheres ; •
- improbable, and there being no c:i rcumstances
raisinc;

.,; ibt as to its trutl i, the debt has been conclusive

established

;:•.-. ;;;<J judgment must be sustained.
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Furthermore, Respondents1 testimony concerning the
representations made by Stevensen himself and by his secretary
clearly establishes Appellant's obligation since his representations are admissions against interest.

This court

recognized the fundamental principle when it stated in
Petersen v. Anderson, 115 Utah 548, 549, 206 P.2d 714, 715(1949) :

"It needs no citation of authorities that an admission

against interest is competent evidence as to the facts
contained therein."

Appellant's own admissions, as testified

to by Respondents, are sufficient basis for an award of
judgment in favor of Respondent DAB; the admission by his
secretary merely makes the conclusion more inescapable.

As

stated in 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 600,
. . . [T]he admissions of a party made directly by
him, or through his agent duly authorized to speak
for him, or by a privy, relative to the subject
matter of a suit, are admissible in evidence against
such party where they are inconsistent with the
claim he asserts in the action, whether he is the
plaintiff or the defendant, and whether or not he
is available as a witness. (emphasis added; citing
cases)
Despite Appellant's arguments to the contrary, Stevensen's
secretary was his agent, and therefore had the authority to
speak for and on behalf of Stevensen.

As stated in 3 C.J.S.

Agency §§ 16, 548, whether an individual is an agent or a
servant depends on the facts peculiar to the case, and
whether the act in controversy is within the scope of his
employment is a question for the trier of fact.

The Trial

Court found on uncontroverted evidence that Stevensen's
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secretary was his agent and that Aggie justifiably relied
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Aggie's Restaurant has resulted in a discharge of the
Appellant's obligations to those members to whom he owed
money.

A reversal of the Trial Court's decision would have

the added effect of discharging the Appelant1s debt to
Respondent DAB and would thus result in a total discharge
of the debts incurred by the Appellants without monetary
expense to Appellants.

Such a result is not just in either

law or equity.

^
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CONCLUSION
From t\vr

foregoing it appears clear that the Trial Court's

I inj'!' * n H>*\\ i.l'- • ' 11 ijt u v e J s <.»d w i 11 1 x: espec ' » o its cienia 1 c f: Respondei 11' s
Motic , to

dismiss based upon waiver, collateral estoppel and res

judicat,

ib ueriidx ul Respondent's Motion to Dismiss for Defective

Notice. ,r.

=?c +-o its dismissal of R e s p o n d e n t s Counterclaim against

Appellants for * . M t i o n of 1 \o covenant o~ xjiei. \TA: peaceful
possess:! o.

*.

affirmed as -

^

•

other matters.

Respondents ?,7\R \rrTc.
Respondent
entire + <<>»

e

...
nereof.

:

l

adopted P O I U L O i

.: > » ,. „z reiterating

. . ..

Respondent Nikol.- :;a.* sh w

i

:

:

*f
.

.

^e

. • .- 3rief that

plaintiff's appeal inasmuch as Appellant failed to serve notice
of such appeal withi n the ten day limitation as required by the
r il ] e s

11 i addi tioi i to Re spoi idei I t N :i ko 1 s ' coiitinen ts , we have s 1 10wn

i n this Brief that this Court is likewise without jurisdictioi i to
hear Point 111 of p l a i n t i f f 1 s appeal inasmuch as Appel ] ai it fa i led
(. i ?>er ve timely noti ce of thi s appeal wi thin the said tei i day
limitation

Appel 1 ant's cause of action and appeal are unquestionably

based upon the iin 1 awfi :i ] d e t a : i n o r sf.it it! i

i m I,

iccoril i n g I , A p p e j 1 a n I

w a s bound by the time limitations prescribed w:i th respect thereto.
Respondent Nikols has also clearly shown that the Trial Cour t: erred
" "

i n<( K v s i j o t i c j t ' i i t ',

-

D e f e c t i v e I Jot ii.v

,md

iismissing Respondent s Counterclaim tor violation of the covenant
of quiet and peaceful possession.
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With respect to Point IV, Respondent Nikols has shown, in
his Sub-paragraphs A. and B., that the lease agreement clearly
provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party
and that the Trial Court properly awarded attorneyfs fees to
Respondents Nikols and DAB,

In addition to Respondent Nikols1

comments, we have shown in this Brief that the Trial Court must have
found that Appellants were in default under the lease and,
accordingly, Respondents were entitled to attorney's fees pursuant
to Paragraph 16 of the lease which provided for an allowance of
attorney's fees against the defaulting party.

Although Respondents

do not concede that the Trial Court acted properly in dismissing
their counterclaim, it has been shown that the dismissal thereof
does not affect the award of attorney's fees.

The dismissal of the

Counterclaim shows only that for one reason or another, the Trial
Court concluded that Respondents had failed to prove their cause
of action for breach of the covenant of quiet and peaceful possession.
The dismissal does not show that Appellants were not in default.
It has been further shown in this Brief that the attorney fees
provision of the lease inures to the benefit of Respondents DAB
by virtue of the fact that the principal lease has been assigned
to them.

Accordingly, the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees

must be affirmed.
Respondent Nikols has also, in Points V and VI of his Brief,
clearly shown that the Trial Court acted properly in determining
that Respondents were not in default under the lease.

Respondent

Nikols has shown that any change in the operation of the leased
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premises which may have been made did not constitute a
the lease, and that, ever: : : t l * s • .-.o., •:;•"*
Jo e x i s o

reacli of

<-o"

,

....

.-y ar** not sufficient to work a forfeiture of the

Lease Agreement.

Court properly awarded judgment in the sum of $613,01 to Respondents
DAB.

The uncontroverted evidence adduced at: -

• >

-o'ensen, I.* ) words ..nul conduct,- obligated himseii
Respondents DAB,

u-

*

L.,.O -urn

Appellant Stevensen wholly failed +.- oTit.nvert

that evidence in any way whatsoever

/ i< -

of the Trial Court with respect to the a-varri <-• $(o J ,w
Respondents DAB must be affirmed.
Respect f u I 1 '
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